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Abstract. While advocates argue for the disruptive impact of marketplace business models and Blockchain in various regards, their practical effects on today’s
organizations are still limited. This study reviews the current body of literature
on Blockchain-enabled Marketplaces in Business Ecosystems, outlines present
scopes, and disregarded topics. Our review shows that publications predominantly
focus on conceptual models that favor Blockchain-for-all-solutions and neglect
several fundamental marketplace dimensions. We raise a critical voice regarding
the status quo and outline paths for future research.
Keywords: Blockchain, Marketplace, Business Ecosystem, Literature Review
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Introduction

"How can a major business segment be invaded and conquered in a matter of months by
an upstart with none of the resources traditionally deemed essential? And why is this
happening today in one industry after another?" [1, p.3]
As Parker and colleagues illustrate, today’s organizations face a multitude of challenges.
Besides addressing the digital transformation, new market competitors challenge established players with their ecosystems and disrupt industry dynamics. Prime examples
of this paradigm are sharing services like Uber or Airbnb, which effectively allocate
resources among users. They act as Matchmakers [2] between two (or more) customer
groups that play different roles in a two-sided market [3], usually represented by a supplyside and demand-side [4]. At the center of a two-sided market ecosystem is a digital
infrastructure, often orchestrated by one dominant firm. Their primary goal is to convince
as many users as possible of their concept and generate network effects [2]. However,
to establish a solid user base, the most crucial endeavor for matchmakers is building
trust [5]. Consequently, scandals involving data sovereignty have shaken this trust [6].
As a result, more and more voices call for alternative models to today’s winner-takes-all
favoring platform economy [7–9], especially in business interactions [10].
In the context of decentralization, a new technology has emerged that offers an
alternative to toady’s oligopoly structures: Blockchain (BC). It is often used as a prime
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example of a movement aiming to disrupt the disruptors, also referred to as the decentralized web or web3 [11]. The basic idea of this paradigm shift is to democratize the web by
leveraging technologies like BC, Multi-Party Computation (MPC) and others, that rely
on cryptographically secured mechanisms and empower individual sovereignty. In web3,
the system itself, data, and interaction rules are not managed by a few companies or
organizations that rule the internet as it exists today. Instead, ecosystems are governed by
their users, operated via a distributed network topology, and built upon open protocols.
Since the last decade, a highly diverse and steadily growing community of scholars
studies BC phenomena. Researchers analyzed various technological aspects [12], its
potential in different application domains [13], application frameworks [14], and how
the technology could potentially be disruptive for intermediaries [15]. Despite these
efforts, scholarly publications on BC-related markets seem to focus primarily on generic
or consumer perspectives [16, 17]. We also note this foci among literature reviews
[18]. Driven by expectations about BCs transformational impact on businesses, recent
Information Systems conferences indicate an increased community interest to focus
both on the IT-artifact and surrounding (economic) structures of BC-based ecosystems.
Following this research stream, we argue it is time to explore BC-enabled marketplaces
(BMs) in business ecosystems (BEs), where a variety of organizations interact with
each other. Towards this end, our study structures extant contributions on this topic in a
concept-centric literature review (LR). Following Leidner’s polylithic framework [19],
we set out to conduct an organizing LR that focuses on synthesis rather than theorizing.
We adopt a holistic perspective and aim to evaluate whether future inquiries build on
the shoulders of giants or dwarfs. Against this background, we address the following
research question: How to synthesize and structure available literature on BMs in BEs?
In the remainder of the paper, we draw rich contextual insights that both practitioners
and researchers hopefully deem fruitful. We start with a brief overview of marketplace
and BC fundamentals (Section 2) and the methodological design of our LR (Section 3).
Then, we provide a holistic overview and unified basis for research related to BMs in
BEs, summarizing design concepts across studies (Section 4). To avoid heterogeneous
understanding, we analyze and structure each concept along Weinhardt et al.’s and
Gimpel et al.’s Market Engineering (ME) Framework [20, 21]. We also derive specific
questions for future research that are rooted in shortcomings of available publications
and show how our understanding of BM can be enhanced (Section 5). Concluding, we
encourage scholars to focus on a holistic view of BMs that respects its multidimensional
nature (Section 6). Besides scholarly contributions, our study is relevant to practitioners
as it pinpoints which artifacts need to be considered when designing BMs in BEs.

2
2.1

Foundations
Marketplaces as Matchmakers

Research on marketplaces as matchmakers is a diverse and interdisciplinary discipline
that receives considerable attention in academic discourse [4]. Aligned with the definition
of Strobel [22], we define a marketplace as a logically central point, where transactions
are coordinated through agent interactions, aiming to transfer tangible or intangible

transaction objects from one agent to another and vice versa. Agents represent instances
of acting stakeholders, have tasks, goals, and responsibilities, and communicate with
other agents via protocols. For the classification of agents in marketplaces, Veit [23]
distinguishes between two types: (1) software agents that represent the participating
stakeholders and interact based on standardized communication protocols and (2) middle
agents that mediate between offering and requesting agents and thus provide a coordination mechanism that supports transactions. Agents operating in a marketplace can be
further characterized as buyers and sellers (instantiated by software agents) or intermediaries (instantiated by middle agents) [22]. Within a marketplace, different interaction
phases and market mechanisms can be distinguished [22–24]. First, a buyer requests
a service and receives information about an offer provided by a seller. Then, sellers
submit an offer and may negotiate with the buyer. Finally, a transaction concludes with a
binding contract, followed by exchanging goods/services and payments.
2.2

Blockchain and web3 technologies

In response to a loss of trust in intermediary third parties, Satoshi Nakamoto developed
a cryptocurrency named Bitcoin, thereby introducing BC as its technological basis [25].
In generic form, BC is a distributed, shared, pseudonymous, digital ledger that manages
transactions between multiple participants (nodes) of a network [12]. Its structure corresponds to a chained list of blocks that are not stored on central servers and managed
by intermediaries but instead decentralized between numerous participants in peer-topeer networks [25]. Trust between peers is characterized by a transparent, persistent,
chronologically updated, and immutable transaction ledger, a combination of established
cryptographic technologies, and consensus mechanisms that validate new transaction
blocks before being added to the chain [12]. A frequently used validation method is the
proof-of-work consensus, whereby competing miners solve complex mathematical puzzles [25]. Depending on the type of BC (public/private and permissioned/permissionless)
and data storage (on-chain/off-chain), access to the ledger can be restricted based on
rules. Complementary smart contracts (SCs) allow for automatic execution of program
code and contract structures, for instance, in business environments [26]. The term web3
describes the decentralization movement and encompasses all related technologies [11].
The technology’s value propositions (e.g., intermediary-free, transparent, secure, and
tamper-proof record of transactions [11, 15]) will thereby facilitate the vision of BMs.
These may be considered as a multi-layer perspective with four dimensions [18]: First, an
environment layer describing external contingencies of a market; second, an infrastructure layer with Blockchain-specific protocols; third, an application layer for economic
value creation; and fourth, an agent layer characterizing the behavior of economic agents.

3

Literature Review Design and Methodology

In this review, we collected literature on BMs in BEs and structurally analyzed the body
of research (Fig.) To this end, we screened relevant outlets following the methodological
approaches suggested by Webster and Watson [27] and vom Brocke et al. [28, 29].

Search Strategy. We included publications in our review that comprise the following. First, they must focus on BMs as the unit of analysis and derive explicit or
implicit insights on designing BMs. More precisely, models, frameworks, or protocols
for mediating supply and demand through BC and other web3 technologies [30] and
thereby, taking care of allocation problems. Second, publications must focus on BEs
and its business actors. Consequently, we excluded papers that solely recognize BC
as a database (i.e., for traceability reasons). Next, we neglect scenario analyses, BC
applicability frameworks for specific use cases or industries and manuscripts examining
overall BC fundamentals or limitations. Furthermore, we disregard technical papers improving or proposing algorithms without focusing on mediating BMs and only consider
peer-reviewed publications (i.e., no working papers, early-stage drafts, or white papers).
Our initial literature base builds on querying a wide range of interdisciplinary research databases1 over the period 2008-2021. Thereby, we extend our search to outlets
outside the IS discipline [27], reflecting the topic’s interdisciplinary character. For the
database search, we constructed a query consisting of several topic-related key terminologies2 . We conducted the first database search in January 2021 and repeated the process
in July 2021. We obtained a total of 946 studies. Examining titles and abstracts of all
papers matching our inclusion criteria resulted in 87 articles. Studies that did not contain
any previously specified keywords or belong to the outlined above exclusion criteria.
were removed from the analysis corpus. Reviewing the 87 retained articles’ full text
yielded 20 relevant manuscripts. Subsequent iterative backward and forward search [27]
revealed 16 additional relevant articles, resulting in a final set of 36 articles for in-depth
review.

Databases:
ACM DL
AISeL
EBSCOHost
Emerald Insight
IEEEXplore DL
ScienceDirect
Scopus
Web of Science
Taylor/Francis
Wiley

Step 1: Literature Search
(Title, Abstract, Keywords)
Journal
search

Conference
search

Search query:
[Decentral* OR Web3 OR
Blockchain] AND [Platform OR
Marketplace] AND [Business OR
Business Ecosystem OR B2B
OR business*to*business]

Step 2a: Literature
Selection

Step 2b: Literature
Selection

Abstract-, Main textbased selection

Backward &
Forward Search

20/87

16

Result:
Literature Corpus

36
in-depth review

Figure 1. Literature Search Strategy, adopted by [27–29]

1

Analysis and Conceptualization. We follow an exploratory and concept-centered
approach by classifying each publication in our literature corpus (LC) using a concept
matrix [27]. By summarizing findings along dimensions that relate to the design of BMs,
we identify focal elements in existing research and identify areas for future inquiries. To
ensure that our dimensions are structured, analytical sound, coherent, and sufficiently
distinguishable from each other, we propose to align them towards Weinhardt et al.’s
and Gimpel et al.’s ME Framework [20, 21]. This approach appears to be appropriate,
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ACM DL, AISeL, EBSCOHost, Emerald Insight, IEEEXplore, ScienceDirect/Scopus, Web of
Science, Taylor/Francis, Wiley.
[Decentral* OR web3 OR Blockchain] AND [Platform OR Marketplace] AND [Business OR
Business Ecosystem OR B2B OR business*to*business].

as it reasonably reflects the interdisciplinary character of BMs, which constitute both a
resource allocation mechanism [31], and a networked information system [32]. It embraces both business and IT perspectives as well as disciplines influenced by economics
(i.e., mechanism design). Accordingly, we reflect this interdisciplinary character in our
review’s concept matrix dimensions.

4

Literature Review Results

Our LC comprises 20 journal articles and 16 conference proceedings and was published
within the last six years: 2021 (n=5), 2020 (n=9), 2019 (n=8), 2018 (n=12), 2017
(n=1), and 2016 (n=1). About the research methods3 used we found that a majority of
contributions is based on qualitative research, whereof 30 studies focus on concepts
and frameworks. Of these, twelve authors evaluate their assumptions using case studies
and proofs of concepts. Other less frequent methods include literature analyses (n=6),
interviews (n=3) and content analyses (n=1). Quantitative insights are presented in one
study where researchers apply mathematical models. We classify three publications as
speculation/commentary as their research derives from weakly supported arguments or
opinions with little or no evidence. According to Edmondson and McManus [33], who
assess the maturity of research fields, the low number of quantitative studies shows that
the topic under investigation can currently be considered a nascent research field.
In terms of the domains, we identify a clear focus on manufacturing (n=18). However,
some researchers also deal with logistics (n=5), while isolated articles exist in the realms
of aircraft (n=1) and chemistry (n=1). In addition, a small number of publications (n=4)
do not focus on a specific domain but approach data sharing through BMs as a generic
issue. Finally, five publications appear too general to be categorized in a particular field.
Following, we analyze our LC using concept matrix dimensions guided by the ME
Framework4 . It consists of interdependent structures and protocols (micro-structure for
marketplace mediation, business structure, IT infrastructure), auxiliary services, agent
behavior, market outcomes and performance, which all relate to a transaction object
embedded in a market environment [21]. Moving forward, these dimensions are clustered
as structural guidelines to analyze BMs in institutional settings.
4.1

Market Environment and Transaction Objects

Market Environment. This dimension defines the problem space in which the phenomena of interest reside [34]. It is characterized by laws, rules, regulations, and social norms
and beyond a market engineer’s control [20, 21]. Among our LC, about a third (n=11)
addresses the market environment. Referring to the total addressable market, some authors recite a strong market growth in the field of additive manufacturing [35]. Others
focus on challenges faced by industry domains and present both the capabilities and
potential of BC solutions [36–39]. In addition, seven publications deal with requirements
3
4

Note that the total methodologies used sum up to 54 as some articles use more than one method.
Since our categorization is not disjunctive, each publication may be assigned towards more than
one dimension.

for BMs. For example, in the context of commercial aircraft leasing, Kuhle et al. [37]
discuss regulatory requirements and business needs. Some scholars address detailed
functional and non-functional requirements through qualitative approaches [40, 41]. Others formulate requirements without a structured modeling approach [36, 42, 43]. Some
manuscripts further present BC projects that deal with BMs in a relatively unstructured
manner [42, 44–46], while others follow a more analytical approach based on a LR [47].
Transaction Objects. Regarding BMs, we identify two types: generic and specific.
G ENERIC refers to interactions that do not focus on one a dedicated use case. Depending on the domain, traded data can vary and is thus highly heterogeneous. Among
our LC, the majority of studies (n=30) belong to this category. These include BMs
with a business-specific focus, targeting the exchange of IoT data between organizations [42, 44, 48] or capacity matching in collaborative manufacturing [49].
S PECIFIC include objects that represent a physical commodity (n=6). Five of these
papers stem from the manufacturing domain. Hasan and Starly [50] and Angrish et
al. [51] outline transactions involving CNC machined parts, while Barenji et al. [52]
discuss 3D printing use cases. Other scholars address equipment sharing, and predictive
maintenance [39], as well as maintenance services in general [47]. In addition, Kuhle et
al. [37] deal with leasing contracts for aircrafts.
4.2

Design of Blockchain-enabled Marketplace Mediation

The micro-structure dimension covers the core process of marketplace transactions – the
mediation between supply and demand to allocate a transaction object [22]. Input to this
function is a set of offers and a request (one-to-many relationship) yielding a ranked list
of offers best matching a request. Our concept matrix introduces three subcategories: (1)
Identity and Participation, which describes market participants and applicable participation rules; (2) Mediation Type, which distinguishes different marketplace models; and
(3) Mechanisms, which describes the interaction phases of a marketplace transaction.
Identity and Participation. The I DENTITY M ANAGEMENT (IDM) describes attributes related to actors within a BM. Overall, it appears that explicit specification of
IDM attributes is not a central subject in our LC’s BM concepts. Two scholars briefly
mention BM agent identification but do not elaborate further on it [53, 54]. About a
quarter of our LC (n=11) outlines a rough IDM concept but does not address essential
IDM attributes in organizational settings (e.g., certificates for identity attestation). Of
these publications, nine draws on the asymmetric cryptographic system of public and
private key [37, 39, 48, 50, 55–59]. To assign these pairs, some authors propose the use
of SCs [39, 59], others use Ethereum addresses without specifying their allocation [51].
Hofman et al. [49] design an ERC-20 token contract to represent a machine in their collaborative manufacturing marketplace. Certificates associated with business partner IDs
are considered in three publications [49, 51, 54]. Two authors remark them as essential
for business interactions but, however, do not describe how certificates can be integrated
into their BM concept [49, 54]. Equally shallow and without an implementation concept,
Angrish et al. [51] describe that they include an ISO quality certification authority in
their network that can independently verify the validity of a manufacturer’s certificate.

To foster trust between entities, Innerbichler and Damjanovic-Behrendt [60] propose a
concept based on the distinction between delegated and federated IDM. In the former
(delegated IDM), identification is outsourced and curated by another system; in the latter
(federated IDM), each participant retains its entity information and stores it in multiple
nodes. Economically, it is noteworthy that so far, only one paper [57] explicitly states
that registration fees are charged in connection with BM registrations.
Likewise, PARTICIPATION RULES, representing a BMs governance, seem to take on
a subordinate role. In principle, one-third of our LC (n=12) emphasize this aspect. However, scholars only mention BM rules as necessary without further specification [61, 62],
reference their implementation in external systems [39], or provide a limited amount of
rules, which does not represent a BM in toto [37,42,47,55]. For separation of concerns in
rules execution, Hasan and Starly [50] propose three different SC architectures to control
permissions, behavior, attributes of stakeholders, assets, and the core system. Regarding the rule’s governance, we identify two approaches: One research stream proposes
governance structures through a third party that grant access to known participants and
automates this process via SCs [63, 64]. Other approaches emphasize consortia collaboration for governance in BMs [40, 49]. This involves authorities (e.g., a consortium of
industry leaders represented by an association) that are not part of a respective BM [40].
Mediation Type. The coordination mechanism that matches supply and demand and
thus facilitates the marketplace middle agents intermediation may be categorized threefold [23]: First, B ROKER AGENTS collect both offers and requests and represent a ranked
list to respective counterparts. Second, M ATCHMAKER AGENTS solely collect offers and
provide ranked lists of offers to requesting agents. Third, B LACKBOARD AGENTS collect
requests and provide ranked lists to offering agents. Analyzing our LC, we note that no
publication provides a concept for a ranked list of offers. If we disregard the ranking
function, seven papers can be classified as brokering BMs [39, 47, 50, 58, 59, 62, 65], four
papers as matchmaking BMs [42, 44, 46, 57], and two as blackboarding BMs [55, 66]. In
more than half of our LC (n=23), the BM’s role is not apparent.
Marketplace Mechanisms. Various approaches exist that describe a holistic view
of offer and request coordination. We distinguish three formalized phases and adopt that
generic model to analyze our LC [22, 23]: Approach, Intention, and Agreement.
In the A PPROACH PHASE, demand and supply sides exchange information about
trading assets, a process considered in more than half of our LC (n=20). Fourteen
publications propose to publish essential information directly on a BC ledger, without
further specifying how transaction partners can find each other (e.g., [51, 58, 67]). One
concept describes a mechanism to update transactions once they have been published, for
instance, when an offer is sold out [57]. Hofman et al. [49] do not provide mechanisms
to modify or cancel an order but emphasize its relevance for future work. More sophisticated approaches draw on the possibility of external databases for storage, depending on
the sensitivity of data and the importance for the transaction process [37, 40, 55].
In the I NTENTION PHASE, trading partners specify and submit offers (i.e., capabilities) and requests (i.e., preferences), which are then evaluated by mediating marketplace
agents regarding completeness and compliance with BM rules. However, about two-third
of our LC (n=21) did not provide a concept to implement this aspect in their BM. A
considerable amount of publications (n=13) implement specifications and submissions

directly via a BC ledger and SCs but omit the evaluation step. For instance, [51] propose
to write all data in a transaction block, other authors propose encrypted lists for requests
and offers [57], which are restricted in some cases [55]. Evaluations by mediating BM
agents were partially addressed by two publications, while the others did not provide
that function. One concept proposes that producers have to apply for a list of service
requests [55]. Based on submitted information (identity, deposited money, completed
contracts history), consumers decide whether to let the producer submit an offer or reject
it. Another concept envisages that producers publicly register their offering, enabling
consumers to browse a ledger to purchase a product with a transaction [57].
The first step of the AGREEMENT PHASE is the supply and demand matching. This
involves, for instance, the identification of counterparts, scoring, and price discoveries.
However, this aspect has not found much attention by scholars so far. While a large
majority of publications state that their BMs induce a match, they do not explain how
exactly this is supposed to work [50–52, 58, 67]. In publications where all match-relevant
data is published on a BC ledger, authors perform the matching function not by BM
agents but by one of the respective parties. Miehle et al. [47], for instance, propose a
function for ranking offers and selecting suppliers that are executed by a machine at their
market’s buyer-side. Some authors suggest that users could handle the matchmaking
themselves, as they browse a list of service requests [42, 55]. Others propose to deal
with matching bilaterally between involved parties and only publish the results on a BC
ledger [58]. An approach that respects user privacy is proposed by Hofman et al. [49].
They suggest a distributed matching engine based on dark pool protocols. However, a
precise concept including protocols for their BM scenario is not specified. Furthermore,
steps two and three of an agreement, where counterparts are informed about trading
partners and negotiate terms and conditions, are described in one-third of the LCs publications (n=12). The most frequently suggested solution is an implementation via SCs
that executes on a BC network. Hasan and Starly [50], for example, use BC events to
issue a request, submit a quote and trigger the production or distribution of a product.
Other authors suggest an additional (negotiation) layer where users can encrypt data
throughout the process [49, 55], which is more in line with business needs [61, 68].
4.3

Concepts for Business Structure, IT Infrastructure and Auxiliary Services

Business Structure. This dimension describes economic parameters of marketplaces
[20,21] and is the least considered aspect among our LC. While some publications briefly
discuss trading fees associated with BC transactions [48,65], no one offers a holistic view
of BUSINESS MODELS in BMs so far. Closest to this are the considerations by Ozyilmaz
et al. [42], describing business models such as pay-as-you-go and subscription-based
fees for consumers but do not further elaborate on them either.
INCENTIVE MECHANISMS to participate in BMs are discussed by only two authors.
Angrish et al. [51] emphasize their relevance to BC systems and call for research in this
context, but do not elaborate more. Bai et al. [39] cursorily discuss incentive strategies
for miners involved in the consensus process and motivate token rewards.
IT-Infrastructure. Marketplace functions are connected by technical frameworks of IT
infrastructures that implement micro- and business structures and provide an interface

allowing agents to connect to marketplaces [21]. Regarding our LC, we note that all
publications rely on BC technology as their IT infrastructure. The vast majority (n=26)
pursue an approach that we would describe as Blockchain-fits-all-solution. Here, BC
networks provide all BM functions. Authors following this approach propose to store
all data on a BC ledger and handle BM mediation via SCs (e.g., [36, 53, 59, 69, 70]). A
few publications (n=8) pursue an alternative path, where only (encrypted) anchor data
is stored on BCs so that, for example, competition-relevant data can be kept private.
Authors following this path suggest storing identities, access rights, and references on
a ledger, which in turn point to external databases or systems. For this purpose, Bai et
al. [39] use a Distributed Hash Table (DHT), Ozyilmaz et al. [42] a Swarm, and Wester
and Otto [55] an InterPlanetary File System (IPFS). Besides, other authors suggest
storing product-specific data in the stakeholders’ legacy IT systems and incorporate it
automatically via SC oracles [37, 51]. However, they do not describe how this should operate. Neither do Rozman et al. [58] for their segmentation between main- and sidechain.
Concerning BC types, a fundamental distinction can be made between public and
private BCs [12]. About half of our LC does not specify what kind they use. Eleven
publications base their concept on a public BC, with nine concepts implemented on
Ethereum. For example, Wester and Otto [55] use a combination of Ethereum and IOTA,
while Soska et al. [57] rely on Bitcoin for their considerations. Apart from that, seven
publications use a private or consortium BC. Kuhle et al. [37] use Hyperledger Sawtooth,
Li et al. [38] Hyperledger Fabric, and five authors do not specify their choice.
Apart from BC technologies, we note that only three publications refer to other
web3 technologies as an IT artifact in their BM concept. Narang et al. [61] deal with
MPC, limit their concept to decentralized reputation systems, and describe other BM
dimensions peripherally. Bai et al. [39] want to use MPC as part of their BM and outline
its basic functionality. However, they do not specify beyond the fact that data query and
calculation are distributed to different nodes. Hofman et al. [49] draw on a concept that
uses MPC to match supply and demand without specifying it precisely.
Auxiliary Services. This category includes services that are not core elements of a
marketplace mechanism but support actors in their interactions [21]. These include
T RANSACTION AND S ETTLEMENT C LEARING after two parties have reached an agreement and accepted negotiated terms and conditions. More than two-thirds (n=24) of
our LC does not contain a statement concerning the design of this support system. Ten
papers provide conceptual considerations in which clearing is implemented through SCs.
This allows for the automatic execution of the contract to be linked to events. If a service
is completed, the BC ledger could record an event, which automatically creates a SC
that initiates a payment after the agreed conditions have been fulfilled (e.g., [50, 55, 65]).
Eleven of our LCs cases realize payment through a token transfer (e.g., [49,55]). Hofman
et al. [49] advocate for privacy tokens and propose cryptocurrencies like Monero.
By providing rating mechanisms, R EPUTATION S YSTEMS can foster trust among
transaction partners and eliminate uncertainties [5, 21]. While 26 publications do not
deal with this at all, five authors recognize its relevance without proposing a concept for
their BM [42,44,55,63,65]. Some describe that reputation exists in their concept without
elaborating on its implementation [59], others propose to store all historical data (i.e., on
past orders) on a BC ledger to create transparency and hence reputation that is visible to

all network participants [51, 67]. This contrasts with research that deals specifically with
reputation systems and focus primarily on privacy-preserving aspects, meaning that not
all transactions are stored on ledgers for all to see [57, 61]. In line with business needs
that require privacy-preserving techniques, Narang et al. [61] implement their concept
by using MPC and build their design considerations on game-theoretical studies.
Procedures for AGENT C OMMUNICATION between BM participants are not specified
by the majority of our LC (n=32). The authors who address this topic suggest standard
protocols such as APIs [50, 67], or refer to more specialized frameworks such as Hyperledger Sawtooth [37]. To propose a solution particularly suited for agents, Gumzej et
al. [66] use Agent Communication Language (ACL) and the FIPA Contract Net Protocol.
4.4

Perspectives on Agent Behavior, Market Outcome and Performance

Agent Behavior. Based on market structures, a market participant’s behavior influences
market outcomes and performances of marketplaces [20] and needs to be analyzed [21].
However, a micro-economic analysis, which might include agents’ utility functions, risk
aversions, incentives for truth revelation, or conflicts of interest, is only addressed by two
LC authors. Xu et al. [65] propose dispute resolution mechanisms in SCs, assuming that
either a service provider or client will try to cheat the other side. Narang et al. [61] study
different types of agent behavior by using game-theoretical models. Across a spectrum
of pricing and punishment strategies, they discover that trusted seller ratings lead to
desirable equilibrium behavior by strategic buyers and sellers.
Market Outcome and Performance. By designing a marketplace, engineers aim to
achieve a specific M ARKET O UTCOME [20, 21]. However, only two publications specify
how this might look like. Rozman et al. [59] study overall allocation efficiency and find
out that, over time, parcel distribution in warehouse converge to an expected equilibrium.
Narang et al. [61] focus on privacy-preserving cooperations between different organizations and aim to support this with an MPC-based reputation system.
To achieve a desired M ARKET P ERFORMANCE, a substantial number of authors
(n=15) perform specific analyses. While Hofman et al. [49] conduct a qualitative evaluation based on interviews with three domain experts, most authors simulate different
parameters of their BM approach. For example, by comparing three different Ethereum
test networks with different consensus mechanisms, some analyze mining times for
different SCs [50]. Other authors focus on block confirmation time and transaction
latency [44, 45, 51, 57, 65], distinguishing different numbers of users [69] or transaction
costs in BC networks [38, 44, 45, 55, 58, 59, 62, 64, 65] and different consensus mechanisms [52, 64]. Hasan and Starly [50] compare the technical complexity of their SC
code with existing implementations and show that their separation of concerns leads to
lower complexity and lower transaction costs. Li et al. [38] examine business metrics
like Customer Lifetime Value, Business Reference Value, and Customer Referral Value
and claim that BMs outperform conventional solutions in these categories.

5

Discussion and Research Opportunities

In this paper, we synthesized and reviewed available literature on BMs in BEs. We
analyzed methodologies applied and domains represented by the studies. To relate to
BM design deliberations, we structured each publication along ME dimensions. Overall,
we raise a critical voice and encourage a discourse with current literature on BMs in
BEs, as we consider it not quite mature. Referring to the title of the paper at hand, this
stream of literature might rather be described as a dwarf than a giant.
First, an explicit limitation certainly is that a considerable proportion of the available literature rarely meets scientific standards as some findings appear arbitrary in
terms of transparency and documentation, prohibiting reproduction (e.g., [36, 43, 71]).
Furthermore, a large share of work is based on frameworks and conceptual models.
Only seven publications substantiate their considerations with previously identified BM
requirements, while only two scholars provide a well-documented approach [40, 41].
As requirements are the fundamental basis of any market design belonging to any marketplace concept, they deserve more attention [21]. Similarly, the majority of our LC
does not state what kind of BM mediation they pursue (e.g., [35, 58]). Considering that
this distinction is fundamental in marketplace designs [23], this well reflects the lack
of rigor in extant work. Observations regarding the methodologies used confirm this
impression, as data-driven studies are underrepresented. Moreover, no study approaches
user motives and trusting relationships on BMs leveraging experimental study designs.
As experiments reveal insights into actual, non-hypothetical behavior and represent
established tools designing marketplaces [21], this is a natural next step for future work.
Second, we note that a holistic view of BMs seems mostly absent by now. Besides
exceptions like Hofman et al. [49], who shape their BM concept around Design Science
Research (DSR), it appears that scholars seek potential BC applications (e.g., [36, 43])
rather than evaluating how specific marketplace functionalities could be decentralized.
As they devote their attention to Blockchain-fits-all marketplaces, we identify three main
issues with this approach: (1) Storing data transparently on a BC ledger (e.g., [53, 69])
inevitably leads to privacy concerns that are not reflected in most market designs. Especially in BE interactions, confidentiality of sensitive and competition-relevant information is crucial [61, 68]. A few authors already stressed this need and contributed
to research [49, 57, 61]. However, their work either considers partial aspects of BMs
and touches on others relatively sparsely or merely addresses ideas without concrete
steps. Further analyses might concertize this. To avoid Blockchain-fits-all solutions,
scholars might also take a step back and review where decentralization actually improves
marketplaces. In this context, examining the impact of trust abuse scenarios (such as data
leaks by intermediary operators [6]) on user behavior appears as an interesting research
endeavor. (2) BC systems face technical challenges (e.g., scalability, latency, and size)
that must be considered while designing BMs. We emphasize that web3 offers other
decentralized technologies that share similar value propositions to BC while solving
some of its challenges. (3) We allude to the integral understanding of markets and their interrelationships. In this context, micro-structure, business structure, and IT infrastructure
are interdependent [21]. For example, scaling problems (e.g., increased bidding volume
at the end of auctions) may be addressed either by technical means (e.g., adjusting the

IT) or by changes in the business structure (e.g., introducing higher bidding fees towards
the end of an auction). None of our LCs articles shows comparable connections. Without
a structured reconciliation of all marketplace aspects, it is challenging to derive design
decisions, put existing research into perspective, and draw valuable implications.
Third, we outline directions in specific dimensions that future research should address: (1) Given that digital sovereignty is increasingly considered a crucial core element
in platform strategies by the European Union [8], we see a need to study BM microstructures. In particular, we emphasize the relevance of IDM, forming the basis of BM
interactions, but it has only received minor attention. Especially the connection with certificates for attestation purposes might be of great importance in BEs [49]. In this regard,
the symbiosis of Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) and BMs appear promising. Beyond using
SSI for individuals, this may include assessing its relevance for legal entities (i.e., organizations) or things (i.e., machines). Further analyses might elaborate on this. (2) Few
scholars focus on BM governance structures. Approaches that leave the governance to
a third party and allow them to control market access [63, 64], are critical, as this would
lead to centralization and single points of failure, both of which should be prevented with
decentralized systems. Beck et al.’s [40] approach of establishing governance through a
consortium of industry leaders represented by an association appears promising. Further
research could build on these reflections and explore, for instance, collaboration patterns
and business models in BMs. We also see potential in investigating how organizational
and technical decentralization goes hand in hand. This may include assessing which
BM functionalities could be implemented through organizational decentralization and
which need to be secured technologically. At both levels, the impact of consortia could
be exciting avenues for future research. (3) Concerning BM mechanisms, previous
publications rigorously considered the approach phase. However, we criticize the prominent strategy of writing data directly on a BC ledger. Again, we emphasis scalability
issues and the importance of data privacy. Accordingly, we suggest evaluating 2nd layer
solutions and approaches such as MPC and support efforts already dedicated to this
(e.g., [49,61]). The same applies to the intention and agreement phases. Only a few scholars describe these in more detail. Finally, algorithms for solving allocation problems,
including identifying appropriate transaction partners or the ranking of offers, are core
elements of BMs and should be investigated in greater detail. (4) Moving forward, our
review indicates dimensions that have barely received attention in the past research discourse. This includes, for instance, BMs business structure. Besides business models
and their specifics, incentive mechanisms such as tokenization might represent exciting
research areas. Regarding individual BM agent behavior, game-theoretical analyses
might provide insightful results. We also note that the desired BM market outcome was
only addressed by two publications [59, 65]. Since this constitutes the foundation for
considering market designs, we appeal for its recognition.

6

Concluding Remarks

Our study focuses on a structured analysis of BMs based on the ME framework [20, 21]
and is mainly concerned with a holistic market perspective. While not all research disciplines may consider this approach comprehensive (e.g., rather technical researchers

might feel misunderstood), we identify a breadth of open questions and indicate that current research rarely goes beyond the use of BC for BM scenarios, neglecting a structured
approach. We exhibit an intense concentration of extant works focus, methodological
variety, and specific issues addressed. To take the lead in this emerging research area,
we encourage scholars to shift their focus more on a BM perspective that respects its
multidimensional nature instead of following a Blockchain-fits-all strategy. Towards this
endeavor, we propose synergistic efforts and interdisciplinary research approaches such
as ME [20, 21], or DSR [34]. These different perspectives might lead to meaningful
insights for both theory development and practical problem solving and inspire research
questions beyond the focus of contemporary work.
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